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Abstract 
Drawing upon longitudinal, dyadic, comparative case-based research, we analyze the pursuit of optimal 
trust, i.e. trust that is neither excessive nor insufficient, by introducing the concepts of reorientation and 
recalibration. First, we show that large deviations from optimal trust are best addressed by reorientation 
which deals with both too much as well as too little trust. Reorientation processes include substantial 
efforts to change parties’ attributions of the intentions underlying past behavior, to reestablish social 
equilibrium among the parties, and to make structural changes via adjustments to goals and incentives. 
Reorientation is necessary when imbalance occurs in the powerful and opposed forces associated with 
excessive trust (faith, favoritism, contentment, loyalty) vs insufficient trust (skepticism, impartiality, 
exigency, opportunism). Second, we demonstrate that there is an effective path to maintaining optimal 
trust via practices we call recalibration, wherein small deviations are addressed before damage to trust 
occurs. Recalibration maintains inter-organizational trust near its optimum through processes that 
proactively balance the opposed forces. Large deviations from optimal trust in either direction can 
unleash destabilizing dynamics, requiring significant reorientation efforts to offset. Recalibration 
processes are then essential for preserving the effects of successful reorientation.  
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Introduction 
Trust in buyer–supplier relationships has been shown to increase adjustment and flexibility 
(Crocker & Masten, 1991; Grandori, 1997), reduce monitoring costs (Gerlach, 1992; Walker & 
Poppo, 1991), establish superior information sharing routines (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991), and 
reduce overall transaction costs (Asanuma, 1989; Dore, 1983; Granovetter, 1985; Nishiguchi, 
1994). These studies characterize trust in a manner consistent with the prevailing definition in 
the organizational literature, namely as a psychological willingness to accept vulnerability 
based on one party’s positive expectations of the other party’s intentions and behavior (e.g., 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).  
Yet those positive expectations may have unintended negative consequences. Gargiulo 
and Ertug (2006) identify three problems with too much trust: diminished information gathering 
and processing due to the perception that not much vigilance is needed, leading to blind faith; 
high levels of satisfaction and commitment to the relationship, leading to complacency; and 
excessive communication and interaction leading to superfluous, burdensome obligations 
between the parties. In these ways, trust can increase the risk of exploitation (Das & Teng, 
2001; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997), and can systematically undermine its own foundations 
(Thorgren & Wincent, 2011). Given this double-edged nature of trust within inter-
organizational relationships, managers face an ongoing challenge of finding the right balance 
between too little and too much trust.  
We address this challenge through the concept of optimal trust, introduced by Wicks, 
Berman and Jones (1999) and drawing on ideas dating back to Aristotle. We adopt a process-
based view of trust, seeing what is optimal as emergent from the flow of interactions within 
inter-organizational relationships. Trust is not a static state, resource or medium within which 
interactions take place, but rather “an ongoing process that must be initiated, maintained, 
sometimes restored and continuously authenticated” (Flores & Solomon, 1998, p. 206). As 
relationships develop, the parties decide, repeatedly, whether or not to trust each other—based 
on updated information and experience—and managers take action accordingly (Wicks et al., 
1999).1 
We follow Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995, p. 724) in focusing on the “behavioral 
manifestation” of the willingness to be vulnerable, or what they call “trusting action.” As Mayer 
et al. (1995) argue, there is a difference between a pre-involvement willingness to trust and 
actually trusting an inter-organizational partner during ongoing interactions; only the latter 
involves taking on actual risk. The decision to take “trusting action” is made against a dynamic 
background of interactions, practices, and commitments made and fulfilled in ongoing relations. 
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So while parties’ levels of trust may be fixed at a certain point in time, “trusting action” occurs 
within a relational dynamic. This treatment of trust-building as a longitudinal process is 
particularly appropriate whenever the dynamics of trust damage, maintenance, and repair are 
the research focus. Based on this framing, our research question is: 
 
How can firms maintain optimal levels of trust in their inter-organizational relationships, given 
that trust levels do not remain static, and indeed may engender forces within the relationship 
that drive the parties to suboptimal (either excessive or insufficient) levels of trust? 
 
This question is important because supply chains have become a central element in how 
the global economy is organized, increasing the economic, social, and political impact of 
attaining optimal levels of trust in inter-organizational relationships. Furthermore, the pursuit 
of optimal trust facilitates the creativity and experimentation necessary for innovation, which 
formal contracts alone are unable to anticipate or properly incentivize. In addressing this 
question, we describe practices that allow firms to deal with the negative consequences of 
broken or excessive trust in an inter-organizational relationship by never reaching the point of 
needing to repair it. We show how an organization can continually identify and quickly address 
potential threats from too little or too much trust in its business relationships, thus staying close 
to optimal trust. Conversely, if larger deviations towards more extreme levels of too little or too 
much trust occur, a qualitatively different adjustment becomes necessary. 
We draw on longitudinal, dyadic, comparative case-based data, working inductively to 
make two main contributions to research on optimal trust. First, we show that large deviations 
from optimal trust are best addressed by reorientation which, in contrast to the typical emphasis 
on repair, deals with problems of both insufficient trust and excessive trust. Second, we 
demonstrate an effective path to achieving and maintaining optimal trust via the practices of 
recalibration, wherein small deviations are addressed before damage to trust occurs. Both of 
these “trusting actions” therefore have the paradoxical quality of reducing trust when this is 
required for trust to remain or become optimal. Relationships with optimal trust are in dynamic 
equilibrium, i.e., a system that achieves stability even as its elements are constantly changing. 
This equilibrium is grounded in practices that facilitate learning and performance improvement 
while also giving early warning of problems needing attention (Helper, MacDuffie, & Sabel, 
2000). An analogy is control limits in statistical process control (SPC). Ongoing processes of 
problem-solving for recalibration persist until the control limits are exceeded, at which point 
reorientation processes are needed if optimal trust is to be regained.2 
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We structure our paper as follows. First, we briefly provide background on inter-
organizational trust. Second, we describe our comparative case study research design. Third, 
we compare two cases: Nissan in Japan, following establishment of the Renault–Nissan alliance 
(2000–2012); and Honda in North America, early in its development of a supply base (1992–
1994) and then in 2011. Fourth, in the discussion, we elaborate on the differentiation of 
reorientation and recalibration and connect our inductive findings with the literature on inter-
organizational trust and trust repair. We close by discussing limitations of our study and 
offering propositions and additional questions to encourage future research. 
 
Background 
Trust exists at the inter-organizational level when one organization’s members hold positive 
expectations towards another organization and its members (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 
2007; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), drawing on expectational assets such as shared 
identity, roles, and rules (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). Even though trust as a process and 
relational dynamic may not be the focus point for managers, it is continually affected by, and 
emerges from, the everyday routines of exchange and discussion, and a steady flow of small 
commitments made and fulfilled. Both positive and negative aspects of trust can exist 
simultaneously within virtually any relationship (Flores & Solomon, 1998; Gargiulo & Benassi, 
2000), but trust can also change rapidly from the extreme of too much trust to the extreme of 
too little trust. Trust-building activities can have positively reinforcing effects on the level and 
persistence of trust (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Pfeffer, 1994), 
but a negative spiral likewise can lead to low-trust traps (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Ghoshal 
& Moran, 1996). 
To suggest that trust can be optimal is to identify a need for balance between too much 
and too little trust, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 (a–c). Factors that lead to (and are 
consequences of) excessive trust from an organizational point of view are blind faith in a 
partner’s goodwill and competence, inattention to the offerings of potential new partners, 
unquestioned contentment with the behavior and performance of existing partners, and 
unchallenged loyalty to partners simply based on respective roles. Factors that lead to (and are 
consequences of) insufficient trust are incessant skepticism of a partner’s goodwill and 
competence, detachment and indifference to a partner’s wellbeing, relentless exigency without 
ever giving a partner the benefit of the doubt, and gratuitous opportunism that abandons a 
partner despite a history of good performance. 
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Table 1. Antecedents and consequences of insufficient or excessive trust. 
Insufficient trust Excessive trust 
 Excessive investments to protect against 
incompetence or opportunism 
 Underestimation of partner capabilities and positive 
intentions 
 Cutting off access to partner tacit knowledge 
 Diminishing partner loyalty and willingness to 
invest 
 Self-perpetuating assumptions that the other party 
is opportunistic  
 Blind spots/blind faith 
 Complacency 
 Cognitive lock-in, favoritism  
 Excessive, burdensome obligations 
 Vulnerability to incompetence or opportunism 
 Unrealistically positive expectation 
 Escalating commitment to losing course of action 
 Narrow moral/normative code 
 Self-perpetuating assumptions that the other party 
is trustworthy  
 
Since the level of trust between organizations is continuously changing, a stable state of 
optimal trust is an unreachable goal. That is, the pursuit of optimal trust is akin to the goal of 
zero defects in quality improvement, i.e., an unending quest that both stimulates attention and 
avoids complacency (Monden, 1983; Ohno, 1988). Optimal trust can be viewed as located at 
the top of an inverted U, where distance from the top, in the direction of either too little or too 
much, indicates a deviation from “optimal.” 
Based on our inductive case analysis, we develop two concepts for analyzing the pursuit 
of optimal trust. Reorientation is a process through which parties undertake a substantial, often 
reactive effort to address a large deviation from optimal trust. Reorientation processes include 
significant efforts to change the attributions vis-a-vis past behavior, to reestablish social 
equilibrium among the parties, and to make structural changes via adjustments to goals and 
incentives. These significant trusting actions provide both a practical and a symbolic 
communication of intention to move away from past behaviors (Dirks et al., 2009). Like repair, 
reorientation is episodic, but it is more comprehensive than repair because it addresses problems 
of too much as well as too little trust. Addressing problems of too much trust requires some 
processes that are similar to trust repair, and some that are different. Furthermore, reorientation 
conveys “reframing,” and “seeing anew,” both of which characterize the eye-opening 
experience of discovering and making sense of problems in a relationship that affect trust. 
Reorienting allows for steering the relationship in a new direction, rather than simply aiming at 
returning a relationship to its condition in halcyon days. 
In contrast, recalibration is a process consisting of smaller actions taken proactively to 
keep trust near its optimum. These actions include going beyond contractual terms to help the 
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other party so as to maintain positive attribution, and carrying out ongoing benchmarking to 
maintain a social equilibrium in which parties do not take each other’s performance for granted. 
Because recalibration is undertaken proactively at a time when deviations from optimal trust 
are small, major structural changes are not needed to maintain optimal trust. 
These concepts differ in timing and magnitude. Reorientation, like trust repair, is a 
major activity that occurs after a serious problem with trust has been identified. Recalibration, 
in contrast, is initiated before any major problems with trust appear, and has the paradoxical 
quality of working to offset the blind spots of too much trust (essentially reducing trust) in order 
to keep relationships near the top of the inverted U. Recalibration is primarily a skillful 
avoidance, through many small trusting actions embedded in an ongoing relationship, of the 
need for reorientation. Both reorientation and recalibration can address excessive as well as 
insufficient trust. Furthermore, both can validate or reinforce trust, shifting towards positive 
expectations or reinforcing them, and creating or renewing the willingness to be vulnerable. 
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of reorientation and recalibration. 
 
Table 2. Key features of reorientation and recalibration. 
Reorientation  Recalibration  
Substantial effort to address problems of insufficient 
as well as excessive trust 
 Episodic  
 Reactive (after major problem) 
 Changing attributions vis-à-vis past behavior 
 Reestablishing social equilibrium among parties 
 Making structural changes via adjustments to goals 
and incentives 
 Discovering and making sense of problems in a 
relationship that affect trust 
 Communicating intention to move away from past 
behaviors 
 Steering relationship in new direction 
Process consisting of smaller actions to keep trust 
near its optimum  
 Ongoing 
 Proactive (before problems occur)  
 Going beyond contractual terms to help the other 
party to maintain positive attribution 
 Carrying out ongoing benchmarking to maintain a 
social equilibrium in which parties do not take each 
other’s performance for granted 
 Avoidance of need for reorientation 
 
 
Methods 
Research into damage to trust has only sparingly looked at inter-organizational relationships 
(Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009); accordingly many have called for 
longitudinal research on the antecedents, processes, and consequences of inter-organizational 
trust, including failures of trust and the repair of trust (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; van de 
Ven & Huber, 1990; Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
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According to Kramer and Lewicki, “we will learn little about real trust repair (and the 
effectiveness of various strategies and tactics) until we can more accurately calibrate trust 
violation dynamics over time” (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010, p. 268, emphasis in original). To 
avoid an inaccurate understanding of trust processes it is furthermore necessary to understand 
both parties’ perceptions of the relationship (Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008). Therefore, our 
research design is explicitly dyadic and processual, collecting longitudinal data focused on the 
interactions between two large firms, Nissan and Honda, and their respective suppliers. 
How, and whether, damage can be avoided and optimal trust can be achieved in inter-
organizational ties strongly depends on the context in which these ties are embedded 
(Bachmann, 2001; Flores & Solomon, 1998; Wicks et al., 1999; Zaheer & Kamal, 2011). We 
therefore examine interorganizational relationships that primarily occur within a high-trust 
context: the relationship between Japanese automakers and their suppliers. Such a context is 
ideal for highlighting the negative aspects of too much as well as too little trust. We trace the 
chronology of managerial actions that are either building or detracting from trust, consistent 
with what George and Bennett (2005) call “process tracing.” The global automotive industry 
has long been a source of research on interorganizational relationships (Cusumano & Takeishi, 
1991; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Sako & Helper, 1998). The complexity of the auto supply chain 
creates the potential for large returns to the adjustment and flexibility that trust has been found 
to promote (Dyer, 1996). 
We use a comparative case study design to explore the dynamics of optimal trust in two 
cases: Nissan, in the period (2000–2012) immediately following establishment of the Nissan–
Renault alliance, when the Nissan keiretsu was dismantled; and Honda, both relatively early 
(1992–1994) in its efforts to build up a USA supply base to support its American manufacturing 
plants and more recently in 2011. A comparative case study approach is particularly suited to 
gaining deep understanding (Eisenhardt, 1989; Van Maanen, 1979; Yin, 2003) and to 
developing grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). For Nissan, we probe its efforts to 
manage the consequences for trust with suppliers of its dramatic restructuring; for Honda, we 
investigate how it learned to develop and adapt its trust-based relationships with both small and 
large American suppliers. We rely on iterative thematic content analysis (Miles & Huberman, 
1994), identifying a theme from one case, reexamining the other case to refine it, and then 
repeating the process.  
Following Dirks et al. (2009), we focus on four stages demarcated by a central triggering 
event for each case: the 1999 Nissan Revival Plan (NRP) and Honda’s selection of its first 
American suppliers. The four stages are demarcated by these triggering events: (1) period 
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before the triggering event (what kind of trust processes are used at that time?); (2) triggering 
event (how did the event move the inter-organizational relationships in relation to optimal trust, 
and why?); (3) response (what actions were taken by the focal firm in response to the move 
towards or away from optimal trust?); and (4) post-response (how are trust processes affected 
by reorientation and/or recalibration efforts?). Consistent with our process view of “trusting,” 
we regard each stage as containing the seeds of the stage that follows. Triggering events are not 
necessarily a shock from outside the system. Instead the trigger could be the outcome of internal 
forces that lead endogenously to dysfunction. 
Case studies are often criticized for their lack of generalizability. Any choice of cases 
carries risks as well as opportunities (Campbell, 2010) in terms of whether to control for a 
possible explanatory factor or whether to use variation in explanatory factors for analytic 
leverage. We deal with these challenges in multiple ways. First, in both cases, we collected data 
via the same methodology: qualitative and archival data, collected during repeated on-site 
interviews, conducted at both the focal automaker and at suppliers that are similar with respect 
to the types of components supplied. Second, both cases involve the same historical roots, 
namely, relationships between Japanese automakers and their suppliers established during the 
post-war rebuilding of Japan’s economy, and both have a high-trust orientation.3 Third, we take 
advantage of variation in terms of both life-cycle stage and location of the inter-organizational 
relationships. The Nissan case involved long-standing relationships (as much as 50–60 years) 
with Japanese domestic suppliers, and a competitiveness crisis for Nissan in which the liabilities 
of too much trust in supplier relationships are quickly followed by a pendulum swing to the 
liabilities of too little trust. In contrast, the Honda case involved new relationships (as few as 
1–2 years) with American suppliers. This variation is crucial to our examination of different 
approaches to pursuing optimal trust in both high-trust (Japan) and low-trust (USA) contexts. 
Considering cases of too much trust as well as those of too little trust contributed greatly 
to our ability to differentiate reorientation and recalibration. Finally, while comparing two 
automakers in crisis or two automakers building a new supply base in a foreign country would 
have yielded more direct comparability of contextual conditions, our design provides the 
opportunity to identify different trusting actions during different phases of an inter-
organizational relationship. In summary, our focus on Japanese automakers allows us to hold 
constant many broad technological and historical factors that could affect trust, allowing us to 
focus on more micro factors such as maturation and management practices. 
The Nissan case was carried out by the first author over a period of twelve years. She 
conducted face-to-face interviews in Japan and France with key actors between 2000 and 2012. 
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The suppliers interviewed (seven first-tier and two second-tier Nissan suppliers) were selected 
to ensure a diverse set of strong and weak keiretsu affiliations, different relationship durations, 
and primary product and production process. All interviews (except those with CEO Carlos 
Ghosn, one non-Japanese Nissan employee, and French managers in the joint Renault–Nissan 
purchasing organization) were conducted in Japanese. 
The second and third authors studied Honda’s efforts to establish a supplier base in the 
USA, involving visits to Honda and seven of its suppliers in 1992 and 1994. We provided 
Honda with the criteria for supplier selection and Honda prepared a list of 15 firms, from which 
we chose seven suppliers to interview. In 2011 we interviewed an eighth supplier from the list 
provided by Honda that we did not interview during the 1990s. Our choice was based on 
differentiation in characteristics such as primary product and production process, nationality of 
ownership, location, size, age, duration of relationship with Honda, and percentage of total sales 
to Honda. Once the suppliers were identified, we spent 1 to 2 days visiting their production 
site(s) and conducting interviews. In addition, we had eight days of interviews at Honda, before, 
during, and after the supplier visits, and again in 2011. 
The sample we draw on here consists of 18 interviews with 14 Nissan representatives, 
eight days of interviews with 14 Honda representatives, 27 interviews with 29 Nissan supplier 
representatives, and eleven days of site visits and interviews with 70 Honda supplier 
representatives. All interviews took place face-to-face, and extensive notes were taken during 
each interview. For Nissan, almost all interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim. Only 
two Nissan interviewees indicated they preferred not to be recorded. Key characteristics of the 
two focal firms and details of our methods are provided in Table 3 and 4. 
Our respondents at both focal firms as well as their suppliers included managers, shop 
floor workers, supervisors, union officials, production engineers, and corporate staff. In each 
phase of our fieldwork we asked respondents about their day-to-day operational ties, and the 
problems and opportunities for improvement that had emerged over the course of their 
relationship. We also asked about levels of trust, and key events in their time of doing business. 
In both cases, our fieldwork included multiple plant visits that afforded us the opportunity to 
observe events and relationships not entirely under the control of the interviewee. In addition, 
the first author served as a production employee in a plant in the Nissan supply chain during 
August 2002. 
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Table 3. Main interviews Nissan and Honda case. 
 
Company Number of 
informants 
Informants’ roles Years 
interviews 
took place 
Total 
interview 
hours 
Nissan case 
Nissan 14 CEO  
Member of the board 
RNPO Manager  
Senior manager 
Nissan Labor Union representative 
2001 
2002 
2005 
2008 
2012 
26 
Tier 1A 6 Executive Vice President (ex-Nissan 
employee)  
Senior manager 
2001 
2002 
2008 
17 
Tier 1B 1 Manufacturing staff (ex-Nissan 
employee) 
2001 
2002 
6 
Tier 1C 4 Senior manager 2008 
2012 
4 
Tier 1D 1 Senior manager 2008 
2012 
6 
Tier 1E 1 Senior manager 2008 1 
Tier 1F 2 Senior manager 2008 5 
Tier 1G 2 Senior manager 2008 
2012 
6 
Tier 2A 11 Founder  
President 
Senior manager 
Production line manager 
Manufacturing staff 
2001 
2002 
2006 
2008 
2012 
30 
Tier 2B 1 President  2008 
2012 
13 
Honda case 
Honda 14 Senior manager 
Purchasing staff 
1992 
1994 
2011 
120 
Capitol Plastics 6 Manager 
Material services staff 
1992 10 
Donnelly Corporation 17 Executive 
Product line manager 
Plant manager 
Manufacturing staff 
1992 30 
Greenville 
Technologies Inc. (GTI) 
6 Manager 
Engineering staff 
Manufacturing staff 
1992 10 
Progressive Stamping 6 Executive 
Manager 
Manufacturing staff 
1994 12 
Tower Automotive 9 Manager 
Manufacturing staff 
1994 16 
Sumitomo Electric 
Wiring Systems 
(SEWS) 
12 Manager 
Sales staff 
Manufacturing staff 
1994 20 
Alcoa Fujikura 7 Executive  
Manufacturing staff 
1994 10 
Additional supplier 
from list of 15 provided 
by Honda 
7 Executive  
Sales staff 
Manufacturing staff 
2011 10 
 
 
11 
 
Table 4. Basic information on Nissan and Honda at beginning and end of case. 
 Nissan Japan Nissan Japan Honda USA Honda USA 
 2000 2012 1992 2011 
Operating income US$881million  US$2673 million  n/a n/a 
Production volume 1,314,000 1,060,000 458,248 1,219,000 
Number of cars sold 733,000 647,000 768,845 1,422,000 
Number of employees 30,747 24,200 12,911 25,312 
 
 
Data 
Nissan case 
Period before the triggering event: Trust at Nissan before the Nissan Revival Plan. From its 
founding in 1933 until the 1990s, Nissan invested heavily in building long-term relationships 
underscored by equity stakes with a select group of keiretsu suppliers (Cusumano, 1985). Close 
ties were supported by the structure of Nissan’s purchasing department. Instead of being 
responsible for a given commodity (e.g., suspension), purchasing agents were put in charge of 
specific supplier firms (e.g., Yorozu). Once included in Nissan’s keiretsu, Nissan would 
continue to buy from a supplier. During Japan’s postwar growth, this approach led to ever-
increasing numbers of suppliers. The personal nature of ties was underscored by the strong 
reliance on informal meetings. Personal gifts from supplying firms to “their” Nissan purchaser 
were common practice. This high level of embeddedness created challenges for monitoring 
supplier performance based on substantive data (Sugiyama, 2002). 
High levels of trust had many benefits for Nissan. For example, suppliers would start 
preparations for a new contract before they were formally awarded it. Last-minute requests for 
production schedule and delivery changes, overtime, and even engineering changes, were 
accepted on the whole by suppliers without requesting additional compensation from Nissan. 
Nissan suppliers in this way supported Nissan’s fast growth and financial success during the 
1950s to 1980s. However, over time, these close relationships became a source of competitive 
disadvantage for Nissan, contributing to its financial losses in nine of the ten years in the 1990s. 
Piece prices were above world levels, and supplier service did not offset these. By the end of 
the 1990s, production at most of its seven domestic factories had slipped to around 50 percent 
of capacity, but the number of suppliers had not shrunk in accordance. 
Nissan committed to suppliers because they were part of its keiretsu; it simply had faith 
in their ability and willingness to deliver their best performance to Nissan. Similarly, suppliers 
had faith in Nissan’s guidance. Nissan became lax in its information gathering, and its trust of 
suppliers became “blind.” Yorozu, a Nissan suspension supplier since 1949, reflected on being 
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in the Nissan keiretsu in the following way: “In the days when the company was under the wing 
of Nissan, we were somewhat lax in cost and quality management” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
2003). Nissan did not have mechanisms in place to correct this excessive trust and dependence. 
During the 1990s, Nissan’s management started to realize it had too many suppliers and that its 
ties were uncompetitive, but a real overhaul did not take place. According to one Nissan board 
member: 
 
It was difficult for a Nissan person to take responsibility for extensive [supply chain] changes. This 
person would have been part of the cause of the problem. It wouldn’t be fair if you make others 
suffer by attacking something that you helped to build. That’s why we needed an outsider to take 
responsibility. 
 
Overall, our Nissan interviewees described the pre-1999 system as lacking in tension to 
encourage suppliers to continuously improve performance. Suppliers suggested that Nissan had 
not fulfilled its task of understanding consumer demand, and had made suppliers produce 
uncompetitive cars. 
 
Triggering events: Nissan Revival Plan (NRP) and Nissan 1804 (N180). By the end of the 1990s 
the number of Nissan suppliers and the extensive obligations towards them had grown to a level 
where a radical departure from the past was deemed necessary. To signal that a clean break 
would be made, Renault–Nissan’s CEO Carlos Ghosn announced a dramatic restructuring of 
the supply base as part of the NRP. Shares in all but four of almost 1400 affiliated companies 
were to be sold, and the number of suppliers Nissan dealt with was to be reduced from 1145 to 
600. All remaining suppliers were required to reduce costs by 20 percent within three years 
without assistance from Nissan. These radical changes earned Ghosn the nickname “keiretsu 
killer” (Nezu, 2000), which was often used by our supplier interviewees.5 
Nissan carried out two main structural changes during the NRP: first, a reorganization 
of the purchasing department to put purchasers in charge of components instead of supplier 
firms; and second, a complete ban on gifts and informal meetings after work. Surprisingly, these 
changes initially did not damage trust from a supplier perspective. The expectation of suppliers 
throughout the NRP period (2000–2002) was that, similar to keiretsu times, both prosperity and 
hardship would be shared. In 2002 Nissan proclaimed that it had escaped debt while meeting 
all NRP goals a year ahead of schedule. Ghosn nevertheless immediately announced the next 
plan (N180), which demanded equally stringent cost reductions from suppliers. At that moment, 
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a gulf in understanding over what was appropriate and ethical behavior materialized between 
Nissan and its key suppliers. 
For Nissan, the initial results of the 1999 changes were highly positive. According to 
Nissan, purchasing costs had been reduced by approximately 20 percent in two years. Our 
interviewees felt that this reduction was due almost entirely to reduced supplier profit margins, 
rather than through joint efforts to take costs out. For the first time since the NRP they openly 
announced they were suffering financially. In the media it was reported that: “many [Nissan 
suppliers] have seen their earnings deteriorate severely on the back of requests for significant 
cuts in parts prices by Nissan” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2002). Many of Nissan’s previous 
keiretsu firms formed international alliances on the advice—or, according to several 
interviewees, order—of Nissan. Suppliers frequently saw this extensive involvement as 
intrusive and exclusively focused on Nissan’s global manufacturing needs.6 
The suppliers’ view was that their contribution to Nissan’s revival was 
disproportionately large, and, more importantly, went unrecognized and unrewarded by Nissan. 
While Nissan top management felt it was still correcting course after its perceived “abuse” at 
the hands of suppliers, our interviewees indicated they felt betrayed because Nissan “did not 
keep its promises” to share prosperity, even though the very premise of the NRP was that Nissan 
was explicitly no longer making such promises. In the subsequent period, Nissan faced huge 
hurdles to overcome the gap in perceptions that was rapidly destroying what trust with suppliers 
had carried over into the NRP years. 
 
Response to damage to trust after N180. From N180 onwards all suppliers we interviewed 
stressed they were actively seeking more independence from Nissan, and were not willing to 
invest in their relation with Nissan anymore. This drop in supplier commitment, combined with 
Nissan’s sharp decrease in technical assistance since 1999, meant that “Nissan can no longer 
take it for granted that it will be able to obtain state-of-the-art technologies and products from 
[its suppliers]” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2001). While the “killing” of the keiretsu was initially 
viewed by Nissan as a major success factor in its turnaround, a shift in perspective became 
apparent in 2004 when Ghosn publicly announced the return to some of its previous keiretsu 
practices (Mikawa & Okudaira, 2005), such as a long-term orientation, equity holding, and 
technical assistance to suppliers. To repair the damage to trust, the Renault and Nissan 
Purchasing Organization (RNPO), founded in 2001, defined clear purchasing rules in its 2006 
Renault Nissan Purchasing Way (RNPW). To be able to bid for Nissan projects, suppliers first 
must become part of an RNPO component panel. Panels are completely open to all to apply. 
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Prequalification is entirely based on an evaluation of current performance and perceived 
capacity for future performance, rather than any past relationships. Once the panel is in place, 
subsequent dynamics are no longer market-based and involve some give-and-take, including 
changes to contracts with the same supplier on different RNPO panels. Nissan clearly did not 
aim to reintroduce the pre-1999 high levels of trust based on personal ties, and in RNPW 
defined trust as “to work fairly, impartially and professionally.” The overarching goal continued 
to be Nissan’s profitability through component cost reductions. As one Nissan purchaser 
described the post-NRP approach: 
 
The ability to deliver high quality products at a low price now really has become the responsibility 
of suppliers. Nissan is not willing to just pour money into the suppliers anymore…. QCD [Quality, 
Cost, Delivery] is the basis of the sourcing decision. When a supplier can manage quality as an entry 
ticket, can design and develop, and deliver products and management … cost will make the decision. 
The trend is very much discrete: “Do you want this, you are in straightforward competition, best 
price, you get it, otherwise you won’t.” 
 
Several of our Japanese interviewees at both Nissan and its suppliers viewed these as 
“dry, Western rules” that reflect the “Renault-ization” (Runō-ka in Japanese) of Nissan.7 With 
nostalgia they often mentioned the decline of the “Japanese way.” 
 
Post-response trust at Nissan. Our interviewees at Nissan were confident that establishing clear 
purchasing processes through RNPO was sufficient to establish a new basis for trust with 
suppliers. As a structural change, the panel system with only a limited number of suppliers per 
panel could help in achieving a balance between too much and too little trust. But we observed 
Nissan struggling to find the right approach, and mostly choosing to reward all suppliers (old 
and new) on the basis of current performance to avoid the pre-1999 blind spots, complacency, 
and overembeddedness. Nissan did not devote any special attention to rewarding, even if only 
through recognition, those long-time suppliers who made substantial investments of time and 
effort to help Nissan survive its crisis. In order to regain access to suppliers’ tacit knowledge of 
its products and production processes, our analysis suggests that Nissan may need to deal 
explicitly with repairing past damage in order to restore social equilibrium and shift supplier 
attributions of Nissan’s behavior back to positive in the ways identified by Dirks et al. (2009). 
Instead of moving towards optimal trust, Nissan found that its initial problems associated with 
too much trust were followed by problems of too little trust. 
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Honda Case 
Period before triggering event: Honda’s entry into the USA. Honda’s start in the USA, 
manufacturing first motorcycles (1978) and then cars (1982), was not auspicious. Most 
suppliers did not have a clear sense of what kind of company Honda was; furthermore, their 
expectations were conditioned by their long experiences with the adversarial purchasing 
behavior of American automakers (Helper, 1991). Suppliers worried about ulterior motives in 
Honda’s insistence on learning every detail about a supplier’s production process and, 
especially, their costs. Honda from its side had experienced the liabilities of being overly 
committed to suppliers in Japan during recessions there, increasing its awareness of the 
potential dark side of trust. 
Initially Honda chose smaller suppliers located in small towns, “the kind of place that 
will have a parade down Main Street when Honda shows up,” a plant manager told us. Such 
suppliers were grateful to have the business and were very responsive to Honda’s wishes. This 
approach was similar to Honda’s experience in Japan.8 Initially, Honda did not view these 
suppliers’ lack of skill as a problem; loyalty and willingness to learn were seen as more 
important. Within a decade of opening its first US auto assembly plant in 1982, Honda had 
established stable, trusting relations with small local suppliers, while appearing to avoid the 
traps of complacency, blindness, and excess obligation. It did so by implementing its Honda 
Way philosophy and a supplier development initiative known as BP (the acronym has many 
referents, e.g., “best practices,” “best process,” “best profits,” “best partner”). Honda sought to 
select suppliers that could be self-reliant and responsive to Honda’s current and future needs by 
showing willingness to make investments in new technologies and new capabilities, without 
explicit contractual commitments from Honda. Yet these suppliers in several cases could not 
improve fast enough to keep up with Honda’s explosive growth in the USA, given its desire to 
localize its supply base, and demands for continuous improvement. Furthermore, the suppliers 
had far greater dependence than Honda’s desired 20 percent of sales to Honda;9 too little 
motivation to learn to operate independently; and limits as to how much future investment they 
could make. To avoid constraints on growth and performance problems, Honda needed to look 
beyond these small suppliers while dealing with the risks to optimal trust that the cultivation of 
new suppliers might pose to existing relationships.  
 
Triggering event: Honda’s transition to larger suppliers. Recognizing that its initial strategy of 
working with mostly small suppliers entailed the risk of overembeddedness, Honda took action 
relatively quickly, both to develop new relationships with larger American suppliers and to 
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change their degree of dependence on the smaller suppliers. Compared with the small American 
suppliers, the larger American suppliers potentially had much stronger capabilities to offer 
Honda. They were however reluctant to invest without a contract from Honda for future work, 
something that Honda would not provide in advance of learning whether or not the supplier 
could be a worthy and responsive partner. Honda took a step-by-step approach with the larger 
suppliers, despite their greater sophistication, just as it did with the smaller suppliers. Honda 
started with a relatively small order, requiring only a small investment by the supplier, and 
gradually moved toward larger projects. This procedure allowed both parties to overcome 
suspicion and to build trust gradually. As the manager of one large supplier explained: 
 
With BP, at first there was a lot of nervous tension. We didn’t want to give away the store. Eventually 
we realized that Honda’s wish to know everything is not because they are trying to steal our good 
ideas or because they want to be snoopy. They want a partnership and want to be able to help you 
find the best ways to do things. 
 
Responses to threats to trust. Overall, we found that Honda was able to maintain near-optimal 
trust with suppliers, small and large, via practices that provided ongoing recalibration in 
response to new challenges, allowing the firm to avoid problems of both too little and too much 
trust. Our analysis suggests that they accomplished this in four ways: (1) promoting monitoring 
while learning; (2) not worrying about knowledge spillovers; (3) maintaining competition; and 
(4) promoting reciprocity through proactive use of gifts. 
First, Honda maintained a high level of information-gathering and problem-solving 
activity throughout its monitoring while learning activities (Sabel, 1994) with all suppliers. 
Often this was very hands-on, with Honda personnel working alongside supplier employees in 
the supplier plants. This involvement aimed at balancing the need to monitor the suppliers’ 
existing performance while encouraging them to learn new skills that might disrupt short-term 
performance, but would enhance supplier capabilities in the long run. At some suppliers, 
tensions over monitoring that seemed intrusive threatened learning from BP activities. While 
sensitive to supplier apprehensions, Honda did not view these aspects of BP as a tradeoff. 
Instead, it emphasized that the more capable suppliers became, the more they could contribute 
to discussions in which both sides benefit, a process described by one supplier as “earning the 
right to disagree.” 
Second, Honda managers took a “rising tide lifts all boats” view of the risk of knowledge 
spillovers to its rivals. Honda managers believed that eliminating spillovers might run the risk 
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of suppliers gaining only some of the benefits that accrue to systemic implementation, and 
would reduce their self-reliance.10 This willingness to invest in supplier capabilities even to the 
extent of benefiting competitors impressed suppliers as a future-oriented commitment, 
warranting reciprocity of effort and investment.  
Third, Honda maintained competition by having two sources for most components. 
With ongoing benchmarking at both suppliers, Honda could compare their performance and 
send signals by adjusting the allocation of business to each one. For example, Honda allocated 
business to Matsuyama, its Japanese supplier of rear-view mirrors, rather than to its US mirror 
supplier Donnelly, at a point when Donnelly had not yet made a profit on its large investment 
in a dedicated Honda plant. Honda openly discussed its decision with Donnelly and listened to 
their concerns, but did not change its position. It did subsequently offer Donnelly the 
opportunity to grow its Honda business by investing in a new paint line. Honda hereby 
preserved trust while avoiding the negative consequences of giving a blind eye to supplier 
performance, or feeling obligated to give business to a supplier based solely on prior history. 
Fourth, Honda prompted reciprocity from suppliers through proactive use of unilateral 
and generous investments of time and resources, in order to facilitate its goals of changing 
suppliers’ approach to the relationship through trust.11 These trusting actions were important in 
demonstrating Honda’s loyalty, according to suppliers. For example, Honda encouraged 
Donnelly to take on the production of painted door mirrors for the Accord model, even though 
Donnelly had never done painting before. Myriad quality problems occurred in the first year 
and Honda considered going to a different supplier. Donnelly protested and Honda changed its 
position, offering Donnelly the opportunity to produce door mirrors for the Civic model as well, 
if it would invest in a state-of-the-art paint line. Honda in its turn invested heavily in assisting 
Donnelly. In our interviews, Donnelly employees referred to Honda’s BP staff members in their 
white overalls as “snowflakes, covering the whole place.” This created tension during the start-
up phase from a combination of suspicion (“they’re here to find problems and get rid of people”), 
hurt pride (“who are they to tell us what to do?”), and resentment at ever-increasing targets 
(“good is never good enough”). But quality and cost performance improved substantially and, 
in the second year, the plant won productivity awards from Honda and attracted new business 
from Ford and Toyota, all for a product Donnelly had not made five years earlier. 
 
Post-response trust at Honda: Building positive expectations for optimal trust. Honda’s actions 
were often well-designed to increase positive expectations on the part of suppliers, i.e., 
investing in expectational assets to build a case for positive attributions of its behavior. 
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Suppliers felt part of Honda’s kaizen (continuous improvement) team, joining in the broad 
mission of rebuilding American manufacturing and resolving to overcome the low-trust, zero-
sum culture and transactional short-term contracts that had come to characterize US supplier 
relations. Honda worked to create an inter-organizational culture that would be stronger than 
national culture differences, based on a shared commitment to improvement. To boost supplier 
motivation, Honda was willing to incur substantial short-term costs. In addition Honda set 
highly demanding goals for itself and its suppliers, driven by a culture that frequently evoked 
the founder’s ambitions and “racing spirit.” Because Honda so visibly applied this sense of 
exigency to itself as well as to its suppliers, it helped to legitimize Honda’s demands for supplier 
improvement. According to one supplier: “We think they like it when their backs are against 
the wall.” 
We conducted further interviews with Honda managers and suppliers in 2011. These 
interviews indicated continued use by Honda of recalibration practices, with generally salutary 
results. One supplier, which credited Honda for its growth in size and technical capabilities, 
said Honda’s monitoring while learning practices taught them how to add the value-added step 
of welding its stamped parts together. Honda’s benchmarking also meant that prices were set 
low enough to be competitive, but high enough to enable the supplier to invest in robotic 
welding that made it attractive to new customers while benefiting Honda through improved 
quality and economies of scale.12 
 
Discussion 
We draw inductively on the Nissan and Honda case studies for this discussion, which is 
organized in four subsections: (1) applying the concepts of optimal trust, reorientation, and 
recalibration to our data; (2) comparing the two cases, drawing on attributional, social 
equilibrium, and structural perspectives from the trust literature; (3) identifying the opposing 
forces related to too much and too little trust and showing how the practices of reorientation 
and recalibration can balance those forces in the effort to reach or regain optimal trust; and (4) 
offering propositions to advance the agenda for research on optimal trust. 
 
Optimal trust, reorientation, and recalibration 
The trust repair literature focuses on ways to deal with breaches of trust by restoring the 
level of trust that preceded the failure. Our focus on optimal trust views trust repair as a subset 
of a larger set of trust-related phenomena, including situations of excessive as well as 
insufficient trust, and responses that lead to a transformation of a relationship as well as a return 
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to a pre-existing state. From our inductive case analysis, we conclude that two dimensions affect 
the choice of how to deal with the deviations from optimal trust: first, the amplitude of the 
deviation, and second, its direction, i.e., towards too much or too little trust. We look at inter-
organizational relationships involving customers and suppliers, starting from the customer’s 
point of view on what is optimal, but anticipating that large imbalances, where the supplier’s 
view differs widely from the customer’s view, are destabilizing. 
Reorientation processes are generally triggered by a perception that trust levels are 
seriously suboptimal. This perception may result from dramatic events that are interpreted by 
one or both parties as a violation of trust, or from the realization that relational aspects that once 
were the basis for positive expectations are having negative consequences. In contrast, 
recalibration processes are perpetual and low-drama, embedded in ongoing interactions, and 
associated with organizational routines and associated with pragmatic problem-solving 
practices. 
We offer the analogy of control limits under SPC because maintaining trust at optimal 
levels requires ongoing adjustments to keep within the control band around optimal trust, as 
shown in Figure 1(d). Within the control band, recalibration is sufficient; once the control limits 
are breached, reorientation may be necessary. While optimal trust clearly is not a fixed or 
quantifiable goal, what it shares with SPC thinking is a focus on intentional and explicit learning 
from mistakes and deviations, and the use of continuous improvement methods to keep 
enhancing processes (Linderman, Schroeder, Zaheer, & Choo, 2003; Ohno, 1988). It is a goal 
not always attained but still significant as the guiding force for inter-organizational processes 
that promote performance improvement.  
Recalibrating involves staying within a control band around the top of the inverted U. 
Each small movement within the control band prompts adjustment processes that move back 
towards optimal trust in order to avoid a larger deviation. When these control limits are 
breached, reorientation is needed to move back towards optimal trust. These two approaches 
are temporal complements, not substitutes. Some threats to trust are too large to be handled by 
recalibration processes, i.e., they force trust levels beyond the control limits. Such threats may 
instead require more substantial response of reorientation. Conversely, a reorientation response, 
such as repair to deal with a crisis of too little trust, will depend on subsequent recalibration 
activities to sustain its effect. 
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Figure 1. Different approaches for attaining optimal trust 
 
 
Cross-case analysis: attributional, social equilibrium, and structural processes 
Trust repair scholars emphasize the importance of understanding the interplay of attributional, 
social equilibrium, and structural processes (Dirks et al., 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). 
Attributional processes attempt to change the psychological perspective of the party that 
perceives another party to have committed a transgression. Social equilibrium processes 
address the relative standing of the parties, as well as the conventions and norms that govern 
their relationship. Structural processes tackle formal organizational systems and incentives. In 
our cross-case comparison, we map our concepts of reorientation and recalibration to these 
three perspectives (see Table 5). 
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Table 5. Processes for achieving optimal trust, organized by theoretical perspective. 
 
 Reorientation at Nissan Recalibration at Honda Notes 
Attributional 
Apologies 
Accounts 
Substantive 
action 
Penance 
 
Nissan executive gives 
account of past dealings 
that attributes ‘abuse’ to 
suppliers.  
Dramatic substantive 
action of dismantling 
keiretsu. 
No apologies or penance; 
no public 
acknowledgement of any 
reason to provide these. 
Honda gives account that 
praises small suppliers for 
collaborating and being 
responsive in early days.  
Honda gives gifts of 
technical assistance to 
overcome suspicions of 
information sharing, and 
provide basis for positive 
attributions. 
Nissan assigns negative 
attributions to suppliers to deal 
with too much trust, and after 
pendulum swing to too little 
trust, makes few efforts to deal 
with negative attributions to its 
actions by suppliers. 
Honda aims to prevent any 
negative attributions from taking 
hold and focuses more fully on 
increasing positive attributions. 
Social 
equilibrium 
Apologies 
Penance 
Punishments 
 
Nissan presents its actions 
as correcting an 
imbalance from too-high 
supplier prices. It uses the 
market paradigm to 
characterize the new 
equilibrium.  
RNPO establishes new 
policies to symbolize the 
change in roles.  
Nissan expresses no 
regrets about severing 
past ties and no 
appreciation for supplier 
help during crisis. 
Honda takes actions that 
convey criticism of 
supplier performance and 
communicates the 
reasons.  
At the same time it 
reinforces its commitment 
to suppliers by 
continuously investing in 
them.  
By referring consistently 
to Honda Way and BP 
principles, develops a 
reputation for being 
reliable, fair, trusting. 
Nissan’s pendulum swing from 
too much to too little trust 
misses the opportunity to 
establish a new equilibrium. 
Nissan makes no direct effort to 
deal with negative affect from 
suppliers. Long-term suppliers 
maintain negative attributions 
toward Nissan.  
Honda regularly adjusts the 
volume of orders for key 
suppliers, to signal either 
criticism or reward and support. 
Honda’s approach consistently 
reinforces conventions and 
norms associated with trust. 
Structural 
Incentives 
Monitoring 
Contracts 
Interactional 
patterns 
RNPO establishes new 
contracts, new rules, and 
new ways of monitoring 
performance. Panel 
system is new format for 
process of allocating 
business, could support 
recalibration.  
Honda carries out 
ongoing benchmarking, 
asking for copious data, 
and sharing future plans. 
Honda gives direct 
technical assistance to 
suppliers. 
Nissan relies on benchmarking 
and economic rewards to 
incentivize suppliers to compete 
for future contracts. 
Honda maintains consistent 
incentives and process routines 
within a positive framing.  
 
 
Attributional perspective. The attributional perspective emphasizes the trusting actions that 
affect psychological processes of attribution of responsibility—either credit or blame—in 
relation to prior expectations being either fulfilled or damaged. Such actions as apologies, 
explanatory accounts, remedial responses, and paying penance can function to change the 
negative attributions of damaged trust back to the positive attributions generated by trusting 
actions.  
Nissan’s preferential treatment of existing suppliers before the triggering event of NRP 
had caused it to be uncritical of supplier performance and blind to alternatives. Suppliers were 
22 
 
also culpable in that their costs crept higher during the years with little competition. Hence a 
downside of long-term, high-trust commitment is that both parties can feel content with the 
level of performance that is attained, and do not strive to improve. In order to break this 
complacency, Ghosn constructed an account of past dealings that attributed “abuse” to suppliers. 
He followed this account with immediate remedial action, taking the dramatic step of severing 
equity ties with almost all existing suppliers, hence dismantling the Nissan keiretsu. Given the 
negative attribution of supplier abuse, Nissan offered no conciliatory statements about its own 
contribution to the situation of excessive trust and certainly no apologies or penance. Suppliers 
at this time were startled by Nissan’s negative attributions, but largely accepted the ambitious 
cost-cutting goals. When Nissan did not recognize the role of suppliers in achieving its NRP 
goals ahead of schedule—which would have signaled a shift from negative to positive 
attributions of supplier motivation and trusting actions—supplier perceptions of Nissan shifted 
towards negative attributions. Thus, Nissan’s NRP actions did not achieve lasting reorientation. 
Furthermore, because NRP actions were not designed to facilitate a smooth transition to 
recalibration, Nissan’s post-NRP actions actively damaged trust. 
In contrast, in Honda’s early dealings with small US suppliers, it communicated highly 
positive attributions, praising the suppliers for being so responsive to its demands. To overcome 
suppliers’ initially negative attributions due to suspicions of its high demands for information-
sharing, Honda provided extensive technical assistance as a trusting action to boost positive 
attributions.  
At Nissan, the successful achievement of NRP goals and the immediate push to achieve 
even further cost reductions from suppliers under N180 sparked a full pendulum swing from 
too much to too little trust, destroying the carryover of trust that played a crucial role in the 
early restructuring period. Faced with this shift from positive to negative attributions by 
suppliers, Nissan did not respond with apologies or accounts of the necessity of continued cost-
cutting. Instead, through RNPO, it sought to establish a new basis for trust in professionalized 
norms of transparency and revised purchasing processes, choosing structural reforms that shot 
right past optimal trust towards too little trust. 
In contrast, Honda deployed recalibration practices in response to small threats to trust 
in order to prevent negative attributions from taking hold and to boost suppliers’ positive 
attributions. While having the benefit of being able to grow its purchasing volume, unlike 
Nissan during its crisis, Honda also had to be proactive to make sure suppliers did not draw 
negative conclusions from observing events such as the bankruptcy of some of its early, small 
suppliers.13 
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Social equilibrium perspective. The social equilibrium perspective on trust repair is concerned 
with providing the remedy for a social imbalance, e.g., by addressing past behavior that was 
damaging to trust. Apologies, penance, and even punishments can provide a sense of “settling 
accounts” to restore equilibrium and allow relationships to move forward. 
The Nissan case shows that prolonged high trust does not necessarily provide 
equilibrium. In fact, excessive trust contains the seeds of its own destruction. In this regard, 
Nissan presented its actions of dismantling the keiretsu as the means to correcting the imbalance 
caused by too-high supplier prices. To establish a new equilibrium under RNPO, Nissan evoked 
a market paradigm and new selection criteria and purchasing procedures to shift away from the 
norms that had allowed excessive trust to develop. For suppliers dealing with Nissan for the 
first time, the new RNPO procedures were effective, but past Nissan suppliers were less 
receptive to these procedures because they did not restore a sense of social equilibrium by 
recognizing the sacrifices previously made. Long-term suppliers thus continued to maintain 
negative attributions toward Nissan. For Nissan, on the other hand, history mattered only to the 
extent that past relationships provided a current advantage, e.g., if tacit knowledge allowed 
suppliers to make a better offer than new suppliers. Nissan attributed suppliers’ dislike of the 
new procedures to suppliers’ desire to live in the past, rather than its own lack of recognition of 
their efforts. 
In contrast, Honda communicated criticism to its suppliers within the context of building 
longterm, trust-based relationships. It took consistent actions to reinforce its commitment to a 
given supplier by referring often to the Honda Way and BP principles and policies, thereby 
developing a reputation for being reliable, fair, and trusting. The implicit stability of the 
relationship provided social equilibrium, while the constructive criticism provided the 
necessary dynamic balancing that helped to avoid the complacency of too much trust. 
One striking difference between reorientation and recalibration is the reactive nature of 
the former. When a condition of too much or too little trust has already taken hold, due either 
to major, highly salient events or to a slow accumulation of “small cuts,” the challenge of 
reorientation is to restore a social equilibrium that has been destabilized. In the Nissan case, the 
structural changes made through RNPO were not adequate to deal with incumbent suppliers’ 
negative attributions of Nissan. In contrast, one advantage of recalibration as practiced by 
Honda is that, once established, the practices operate as part of the ongoing interactions in the 
customer–supplier relationships. Small movements in the vicinity of optimal trust do not have 
to be strategized, planned, or initiated; they are just part of the ongoing flow of the relationship. 
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Recalibration practices can even absorb threats to trust without calling attention to doing so. 
Without an “event,” there is hardly the need for “response.” 
This low-drama aspect of recalibration is an important aspect of why it can be effective 
in avoiding the need for wrenching reorientation, and particularly the cycle of damaging and 
restoring social equilibrium that is an important focus of the trust repair literature. When 
operating in this partially-mindful, partially-routine way, recalibration continually reinforces 
positive attributions vis-a-vis the customer’s intention to help the supplier improve, even if the 
customer’s demands associated with the improvement activities are high, difficult to achieve, 
and feel intrusive. Significantly, with recalibration, social equilibrium does not swing far 
enough to register as imbalance. Pragmatic problem-solving activities may lead to small 
changes in existing structural arrangements yet without signaling that the rules had to be 
changed because of big and unsolvable problems. Rather than problems being seen as negative 
or unfortunate, they can be framed positively, as opportunities for learning and improvement, 
helping to justify the investment in joint problem-solving processes (MacDuffie, 1997). 
 
Structural perspective. The structural perspective is concerned with formal organizational 
systems and incentives. It considers the forward-looking changes that govern future interactions 
between parties that repair damage to trust. Structural changes include new or revised incentives, 
monitoring processes, contractual conditions, and communication channels. 
Nissan showed a strong preference for structural changes as the means of shaping its 
new approach to supplier relations. Under the new guidelines developed at RNPO, it established 
new contracts, new rules, and new ways of monitoring performance. Benchmarking 
comparisons and economic rewards of gaining additional business are the incentives for 
suppliers to compete for future contracts. The panel system provided a new format and process 
for allocating business to suppliers. Its first stage is based on objective criteria and is open to 
all, generating a small panel of selected suppliers; specific purchasing allocations are made to 
members of that panel. The second stage, in contrast, is only for these selected suppliers. It 
offers possibilities for recalibration actions since RNPO can look across multiple contracts and 
adjust the overall purchasing volume to provide that supplier with economies of scale and fuller 
utilization of supplier production capacity and capabilities. Nevertheless, Nissan’s actions at 
the second stage seem focused on meeting its own quantitative purchasing goals, with little 
evidence of the mindful intent to strengthen future relations that characterizes recalibration. 
Honda provided a consistent set of incentives and process routines from the start. The 
incentives included Honda’s willingness to make a long-term commitment to a given supplier, 
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i.e., increases in both volume of orders and scope of purchasing over time and the provision of 
technical assistance. The process routines with which Honda engaged suppliers include ongoing 
benchmarking, asking for copious internal data, and sharing its future product and production 
plans. Honda’s technical assistance risks creating high supplier dependence, but also boosts 
capabilities by training supplier employees. 
Nissan’s structural actions are contract-based while Honda’s actions are relationship-
based. Nissan strives to make its revised purchasing policies transparent to new as well as 
existing suppliers and to apply them uniformly, while Honda evolves relationship-specific 
arrangements with its suppliers. Nissan’s actions are episodic, reflecting a multi-stage decision-
making process; Honda’s actions are ongoing, reflecting the back-and-forth of high information 
exchange and frequent interaction. 
 
Summary. The Honda case shows that recalibration requires continuous managerial attention. 
Depending on the history of the inter-organizational relationship, this may or may not be 
preceded by a reorientation process. The Nissan case shows that reorientation may not even be 
on the minds of managers until it is needed, urgently, when the reality of negative consequences 
from too much or too little trust has become apparent. Crafting an appropriate and effective 
response at that point is not only reactive, but often requires attention to all three processes 
identified in the trust repair literature, i.e., replacing negative with positive attributions, 
restoring balance in the social equilibrium, and developing structural changes that not only 
prevent future problems but are a symbol of resolve to avoid such problems. 
These three perspectives from the trust repair literature are particularly helpful for 
understanding the “repair” aspect of reorientation. They also help to identify the differences 
between problems of too little and too much trust and the distinctive approaches they require. 
These perspectives also indicate what organizational actions are not needed during recalibration 
as well as the managerial practices that are necessary. When recalibration processes are 
effective, there is no need to change attributions to positive since they never become negative; 
there is no need to restore social equilibrium since disequilibrium does not occur; and no 
structural changes are required if a consistent set of practices that support the achievement of 
mutual goals and the sharing of mutual gains is in place. 
 
Balancing the opposing forces related to too much and too little trust 
Optimal trust is a dynamic equilibrium that requires balancing opposing forces. In Figure 1(a), 
we identify a set of forces on either side of the inverted U: faith vs skepticism; favoritism vs 
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impartiality; contentment vs exigency; loyalty vs opportunism. We observed these forces in our 
case studies; they provide the background against which to interpret Tables 1 and 6; the latter 
includes a description of practices that balance these forces and how they are manifested in the 
Nissan and Honda cases. 
The forces related to too much trust imply continuity (faith and contentment) and low 
need for managerial attention (loyalty and favoritism) vis-a-vis a partner. Excessive trust is thus 
likely to emerge from a state of organizational inertia within which incremental change towards 
complacency and blind spots regarding a supplier’s performance are unlikely to receive much 
notice. In contrast, the forces associated with too little trust imply that managers are actively 
focused on the prospects of a supplier’s performance decline (skepticism) or, conversely, for 
taking advantage of the supplier’s situation (opportunism). Furthermore, with too little trust, 
managers consciously seek new suppliers, both pragmatically, to meet exigencies, and through 
heuristics presenting alternatives, such as impartial procedures for receiving bids from all 
interested competitors to the current supplier. 
The reorientation and recalibration practices in Table 6 can be applied to both excessive 
and insufficient trust, but each practice may accomplish something different depending on the 
direction and magnitude of the deviation from optimal trust. To deal with excessive trust, 
practices should disturb organizational inertia and sharpen attention to changes over time that 
have caused performance decline. Conversely, to deal with too little trust, practices need to 
slow down managerial impulses to switch to different suppliers or to take advantage of a current 
supplier’s situation, while also reassuring current partners that there will be opportunity to 
receive assistance during difficult periods and to restore performance to agreed-upon levels. 
The opposing forces provide clues as to why the magnitude of deviation or movement 
away from optimal trust affects the choice of reorientation and recalibration practices. 
Excessive trust that reaches the point where organizational inertia preserves complacency and 
blind spots even in the face of a performance-related crisis is beyond what can be handled by 
recalibration practices. Insufficient trust resulting from policies that systematically react to any 
problems with incumbent suppliers by moving swiftly to choose alternative suppliers is also 
severe enough to require reorientation rather than recalibration. Assessing the magnitude of the 
opposing forces, in both directions, can help to forecast which managerial choices are likely to 
be most effective in gaining or restoring optimal trust. We develop these ideas further in the 
propositions offered below. 
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Table 6. Opposing forces in relation to reorientation and recalibration practices for optimal trust. 
Forces of too 
much trust 
Forces of too 
little trust 
Reorientation practices Recalibration practices 
Faith 
Favoritism 
Contentment 
Loyalty 
Skepticism 
Impartiality 
Exigency 
Opportunism 
 ‘Settling accounts’ to restore 
equilibrium by apologies, 
explanatory accounts, remedial 
responses, denial, penance, or 
even punishment 
 Attribution of responsibility 
(either credit or blame) 
 Commitments to the stability of 
the relationship 
 Conciliatory statements 
 Revised patterns of interaction 
 Revised communication channels 
 Revised contractual conditions 
 Revised monitoring 
 Revised, shared goals 
 Revised incentives 
 Developing structural changes 
that prevent future problems and 
are also a symbol of resolve to 
avoid such problems 
 Benchmarking to document 
performance 
 Monitoring while learing 
 Finite commitment: first look for 
solution within relation, then 
outside relation 
 Goal-setting for improvement 
 Challenging but realistic 
expectations  
 Recognition of contribution 
 Consistent criticism 
 No initial assumption of 
opportunism 
 No initial assumption of loyalty 
 Flexibility: allow new entry, 
allow gradual exit 
 Dialogue: about gains and 
disputes, no (big) unilateral 
decisions 
 
 
Propositions 
Based on the inductive comparative case analysis, we offer five propositions to advance the 
agenda for research on optimal trust. Our first proposition expresses the idea of “amplitude” to 
demonstrate that movement away from optimal trust can be in either direction. 
 
Proposition 1: The greater the amplitude in deviations from optimal trust, the greater the 
probability that recalibration will be insufficient to restore optimal trust and, therefore, the 
greater the probability that reorientation will be required. 
 
While the same practices of recalibration can be applied regardless of whether eviations 
are towards too much or too little trust, reorientation is affected by the direction of deviation 
from optimal trust. Damage from too little trust can be addressed by taking steps to change 
negative attributions back to positive attributions. But damage from too much trust cannot be 
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addressed in a symmetric fashion; reorientation will not be effective at dealing with excessive 
trust if it attempts to substitute negative attributions for previously positive attributions. Such a 
substitution is likely to create difficulties for establishing a new optimal equilibrium, as negative 
attributions can lead quickly from excessive to insufficient trust. What is required instead could 
be described as a shift from positive attributions to contingent attributions. Whereas the positive 
attributions of too much trust may cause the parties to overlook or suppress information about 
the performance problem, a contingent attribution asserts that “we can maintain trust in this 
relationship if and only if we can make progress in working together to overcome this 
performance issue” or “we may need to end this relationship despite its long-standing nature 
unless we can improve performance along these dimensions.” 
 
Proposition 2: Achieving (regaining) optimal trust through reorientation requires restoring 
positive attributions when the deviation from optimal trust is towards too little trust, but 
requires contingent attributions when the deviation is towards too much trust. 
 
The asymmetry in how reorientation deals with excessive vs insufficient trust is due to 
the likelihood that both parties are mutually culpable in the negative consequences from too 
much trust. In the short term, asymmetry in too much trust could exist, with one party blind to 
the fact that the other party is exploiting the situation. But for too much trust to persist over 
long periods of time, both parties will in all probability have displayed some degree of blind 
faith, complacency, and cognitive lock-in. The pre-1999 keiretsu relations between Nissan and 
its suppliers are an example of this two-sidedness. 
In contrast, insufficient trust is more likely to occur based on the actions of one party 
that spur negative attributions in the other party vis-a-vis the first party’s trustworthiness. While 
both parties may bear responsibility in situations of too little trust, a frequent manifestation of 
insufficient trust is the effort of one party to affix blame on the other party, as happened when 
Nissan announced a second round of cost cuts under N180. Overcoming the “blame game” is 
one of the primary challenges of reorientation; apologies, causal accounts, and penance are 
often required before social equilibrium can be restored, something Nissan as yet has not done. 
These retrospective remedies are less effective with excessive trust, which requires future-
oriented actions to restore social equilibrium, a path that Nissan did not choose when it 
embarked on its restructuring in 1999. After acknowledging joint responsibility for past 
problems, the tasks of “seeing clearly” and reframing the relationship are best pursued together, 
i.e., working collaboratively to diagnose the shared assumptions and communication barriers 
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that close down inquiry and cause blind spots, and to collect up-to-date and accurate 
performance data from both external and internal sources. 
 
Proposition 3: Both parties are more culpable in long-persisting conditions of excessive trust 
than in situations of insufficient trust. Restoring social equilibrium when trust is insufficient 
requires past-oriented actions such as apologies, penance, or punishment to overcome 
dynamics of blame and denial between the parties. But when trust is excessive, social 
equilibrium is more effectively achieved (regained) through future-oriented actions such as 
mutual recognition of accountability, joint probing of blind spots, and collaborative collection 
of performance data. 
 
Structural remedies that revise contracts, monitoring systems, or interaction patterns can 
be helpful to reorientation in situations of excessive as well as insufficient trust. Such remedies 
are valuable in being both backward-looking and forward-looking. They can fix a past problem 
while also signaling an intention to change from the old ways. But the most effective remedies 
will have a third attribute of helping the parties make a transition to routines of recalibration, 
e.g., monitoring systems that are also designed to encourage learning, contracts that provide 
flexibility, interaction patterns that encourage frequent, open communication and constructive 
criticism. 
Ultimately, the effects of a successful reorientation will last only if reorientation 
practices feed into recalibration processes. In Nissan’s structural reforms through RNPO, for 
example, the first stage changed the rules for who can apply to be a supplier to emphasize open 
access to all and that all contracts will be awarded after competitive assessment. While such a 
structural change may be essential for reorientation, it does not necessarily set the stage for 
recalibration. In contrast, the second stage of RNPO’s panel process provides opportunities for 
recalibration by allowing flexible adjustments to contractual terms in order to increase mutual 
gains. In short, there may be differential consequences of various structural remedies based on 
how they affect the temporal relationship between reorientation and recalibration. 
 
Proposition 4: Structural remedies to violations of trust, crafted to respond to either insufficient 
or excessive trust, can provide reorientation and help to regain optimal trust. But only when a 
transition to routines of recalibration takes place will the trust-restoring impact of 
reorientation be sustainable. 
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Recalibration is the appropriate response when the amplitude of deviation from optimal 
trust is relatively small. It differs from reorientation in that the same recalibration practices are 
effective regardless of whether those deviations are towards too little or too much trust. While 
each specific recalibration action may be a small response to the immediate threat to trust, 
recalibration is only effective if it is grounded—like the Honda Way and BP initiative—in a 
consistent approach, with clearly-stated values, and organizational capabilities and processes 
that insure effective communication between the parties when problems occur. 
 
Proposition 5: Although each recalibration is a small-scale reaction to a deviation from 
optimal trust, to be effective the recalibration process must provide ongoing meta-routines (i.e., 
routines for reforming routines) that are grounded in a consistent and reinforcing 
organizational culture, integrated into broader organizational capabilities, and aligned with 
strategy. 
 
Conclusions 
Drawing upon analysis of our longitudinal and dyadic case studies, we develop two concepts 
for analyzing the pursuit of optimal trust. We find that large deviations from optimal trust are 
best addressed by reorientation, a concept that is more comprehensive than repair in two ways: 
first, it describes processes of recovery from both too little trust and too much trust; and second, 
it encompasses the possibility of a transformed relationship rather than a simple restoration of 
a relationship to the halcyon days of its pre-breach state. Reorientation processes include 
significant efforts to change the attributions vis-a-vis past behavior, to reestablish social 
equilibrium among the parties, and to make structural changes via adjustments to goals and 
incentives. These significant trusting actions provide both a practical and a symbolic 
communication of intention to move away from the past (Dirks et al., 2009). 
Like repair, reorientation is episodic. Addressing problems of too much trust, however, 
requires some processes that are similar to trust repair, and others that are different. To deal 
with excessive trust, practices should disturb organizational inertia and sharpen attention to 
changes over time that have caused performance decline. Conversely, to deal with too little 
trust, practices need to slow down managerial impulses to switch to different suppliers or to 
take advantage of a current supplier, while providing partners with assistance during difficult 
periods in order to restore performance to agreed-upon levels. 
We provide evidence of an effective path to achieving optimal trust via the practices of 
recalibration, wherein small deviations are addressed before damage to trust occurs. These 
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actions include going beyond contractual terms to help the other party so as to maintain positive 
attribution, and carrying out ongoing benchmarking to maintain a social equilibrium in which 
parties do not take each other’s performance for granted. Because recalibration is undertaken 
proactively at a time when deviations from optimal trust are small, major structural changes are 
not needed to maintain optimal trust. 
These concepts differ in timing and magnitude. Reorientation is a major activity that 
occurs after a serious problem with trust has occurred. Recalibration, in contrast, is initiated 
before any major problems with trust appear, and has the paradoxical quality of sometimes 
working to offset the blind spots of too much trust (essentially reducing trust). That is, 
recalibration is primarily a skillful avoidance, through many small trusting actions embedded 
in an ongoing relationship, of the need for reorientation. 
We find that optimal inter-organizational trust is the product of balance between 
powerful and opposed forces: faith vs skepticism, favoritism vs impartiality, contentment vs 
exigency, and loyalty vs opportunism. We show that the best way to deal with the negative 
consequences of broken or blind trust in an inter-organizational relationship is, essentially, 
never to reach the point of needing to repair it. Recalibration can maintain inter-organizational 
trust near its optimum, by creating routines that balance these powerful forces. In contrast, too 
large a deviation from optimal trust in either direction can unleash destabilizing dynamics, 
requiring significant reorientation efforts to offset. Recalibration processes are then essential 
for preserving the effects of successful reorientation. 
We close with a few suggestions for future research. Optimal trust may be an 
unrealizable ideal but its pursuit is highly relevant to the crisis-challenged times in which we 
live. Growth in resources, such as Nissan experienced until the 1990s, may make it less vital to 
be continuously aware of the opposing forces of optimal trust, since the abundance of resources 
that can be distributed to claimants potentially compensates for the downsides of excessive trust 
(Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976). Future research should pay more explicit attention to 
the impact of environmental factors on trust processes. 
Another issue deserving further attention is the degree of dependence between trusting 
partners. We have focused on the actions of the automakers, often larger and more powerful 
than their suppliers. How does this imbalance affect the processes of recalibration and 
reorientation? Is a less powerful party ever able to initiate reorientation or recalibration to 
achieve optimal trust, or does the control of these processes always reside with the more 
powerful party? To answer this question it is essential to understand the perceptions of both 
parties, and thus collect dyadic data. 
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Successful transition from reorientation to recalibration is another fruitful area for future 
research. How should reorientation processes be designed in order to ensure that subsequent 
recalibration processes become routine? Closely related is the question: How can organizations 
identify the control limits beyond which recalibration is no longer sufficient and reorientation 
is necessary? Answering these questions will provide further insight into the temporal relation 
between reorientation and recalibration. Here we reiterate the call for longitudinal data on 
trusting as a process; it is only with such data that these questions can be answered. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. Throughout, the term “optimal” refers to the perspective of the buying firm, which in this research is the 
automaker. This is equivalent to saying that optimal levels of trust will maximize long-run profits for the 
buyer, and to acknowledge that from the perspective of supplier profits, “optimal” could be slightly—though 
not substantially—different. We regard trust as a two-sided concept, in the sense that it is only established 
and maintained with reciprocity of contribution and respect for the interests of other parties. With regard to 
inter-organizational trust, differences in what is optimal for each party arise because trust is not entirely 
symmetric at all times. But major asymmetries would violate trust, creating boundary conditions that limit, 
over the long run, how varied the perceptions of “optimal” can be. 
2. Nadler and Tushman (1989) use the term “reorientation” in the context of organizational change and 
characterize it as a process of “frame bending,” drawing a contrast with “re-creation,” which they characterize 
as “frame breaking.” Their conceptualization differs from ours in several regards. We focus explicitly on 
processes that seek optimal trust in the context of inter-organizational ties, while Nadler and Tushman focus 
on intra-organizational change. They regard reorientation as a proactive process that stresses continuity of 
values from the past and stretches but does not break the existing organizational frame (where “frame” is a 
mix of cognitive perspective, organizational identity, and organizational culture). In contrast, we identified 
reorientation through our inductive data analysis as a reactive and episodic process. Depending on the 
magnitude of the deviation from optimal trust and the direction, towards either excessive or insufficient trust, 
reorientation in our conceptualization could be either incremental, i.e., “frame bending,” or disruptive, i.e., 
“frame breaking,” with respect to the norms and values inherent in the inter-organizational relationship. 
3. Nissan, founded in 1933, developed strong and loyal supplier groups within keiretsu relationships in the 
postwar era (Cusumano, 1985; Nishiguchi, 1994). In contrast, Honda was founded as a motorcycle company 
in 1948 and only began making cars in the 1960s.  
4. Nissan 180 stands for one million more units sold worldwide, 8 percent operating margin, and zero debt. 
5. Ghosn consistently presented these actions as the correct response to the pre-1999 period. When we 
interviewed Ghosn in November 2001 he argued that suppliers had “abused” Nissan. His use of such extreme 
language is striking, particularly considering its dramatic impact in the Japanese context. We assume that 
Ghosn’s choice of language was deliberate; he rendered a powerful negative judgment of past supplier actions, 
in emotion-laden terms, to justify Nissan’s extreme response. In making Nissan appear the victim, he 
legitimized the counter-response of cutting all keiretsu ties as Nissan defending itself.  
6. To document the extent of Nissan’s effort to reengineer its supplier base, we mapped the sale of stock of 
20 randomly selected Nissan suppliers, ranging from small to large firms, for 10 two-year periods between 
1991 and 2010. In 1991 Nissan held an average of 34% in these 20 firms. Just before the NRP this had 
decreased to 29%. By 2003 Nissan held slightly under 15% in only three of these firms; all shares in the 
remaining 17 firms had been sold. In nine cases shares were sold to other, mostly large, Japanese Nissan 
suppliers. In some of these nine cases two medium-sized firms teamed up; each buying the shares that Nissan 
had held in the other. In four cases of the 20 we studied, shares were sold to an international automotive 
supplier that had previously established purchasing ties with Nissan. In two cases, shares were sold to 
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Japanese steel companies. In another two cases shares were sold to a longterm Renault supplier. Honda and 
a Toyota supplier also each bought shares in one of these 20 suppliers. The remaining supplier’s shares were 
sold to a private investor (see also Aoki & Lennerfors, 2012, for information on changing keiretsu affiliations). 
7. One reason that Nissan changed its course may have been the steel shortage in 2004. At this time Nissan 
was faced with the consequences of the complete overhaul of its old ways. The shortage hit Nissan hardest 
of all domestic carmakers, as it appeared “last on the list” of steel suppliers. Nissan was forced to stop 
production at domestic plants for seven days in total in 2004–2005. Steel had been one of the areas in which 
Nissan had drastically reshuffled purchasing ties. It had reduced purchasing from its keiretsu supplier NKK 
from approximately 25% to less than 10%, and cut ties with one of its five pre-NRP steel suppliers. The steel 
reshuffle was seen as “a very clear sign to the industrial world in Japan that the times of preferential treatment 
of group firms was no longer part of Ghosn’s ‘dry’ approach” (Itoh, 2001). 
8. When Soichiro Honda decided to manufacture cars in the 1960s, he had to develop a supply base from 
scratch, drawing on three sources (Mair, 1994): (1) suppliers of motorcycle parts, who were already familiar 
with Honda but had to learn to make automotive parts; (2) small suppliers making components for other 
products or industries but who could be persuaded to invest in new production capabilities for Honda on the 
promise of future business; and (3) larger companies that were already supplying other auto companies. 
Honda’s US experience offered similar choices. When starting with motorcycles in 1978, Honda helped a 
small set of Japanese key component suppliers to move to the US too. While some of these suppliers could 
help with Honda’s launch of cars in the US in 1982, most automotive components were shipped from Japan 
in the early days, until the local supply base could be developed.  
9. We learned that Honda had developed this rule of thumb in Japan after suffering financial losses during 
business cycle downturns due to keeping small, entirely dependent suppliers afloat.  
10. In more recent years, “we had to put a stop to that,” one Honda manager said. BP activities cost Honda 
too much for it to ignore possible spillovers to competitors, many of whom were closing the productivity and 
quality gap in manufacturing. This shift is not unlike the shift made at Nissan as it moved from a growth and 
increasing capability phase to a greater emphasis on making profits. However, due to Honda’s attention to 
recalibration, wrenching reorientation was not needed.  
11. BP efforts at Capitol were estimated by Capitol’s engineers to have cost Honda more than US$1m. 
12. Our interview results are consistent with an annual survey of auto suppliers conducted in the USA since 
2002 in which Honda has remained virtually tied with Toyota as the top-ranked automaker for relationship 
quality (Planning Perspectives, 2014).  
13. A particularly salient case was the bankruptcy of Honda supplier Variety Stamping, which was the subject 
of a Wall Street Journal article (Milbank, 1990) implying that Honda wanted to drive US suppliers out of 
business and replace them with Japanese-owned firms. 
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